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Q10) Nirvāna in Buddhism is used to describe the state where one is able to understand the four folds and ~~see~~ come out of the Bhava chakra and truly understand Pratitya samutpada.

~~Geo~~ Buddha himself did not wish to discuss the metaphysical status of Nirvāna and stated that it is indescribable. He believed that understanding what Nirvāna was, was not important for end of suffering i.e. Dukkha-nirodha.

Buddhism holds the pratityasamutpad theory as the main explanation for cause of suffering. Hence, it describes it as samisāra if view empirically / relatively; however it is described as Nirvāna from the point of view of reality.

The main ~~to~~ argument for its indescribability of Nirvāna is given because it cannot be explained by ordinary language.

Later schools of Buddhism and some Buddhist scholars have tried describing Nirvāna as 'higher than the highest mountains, sweeter than nectar' etc, however has stated that all these comparisons are inadequate.

In conclusion, Buddha believed that understanding of Nirvāna i.e. the life of a Tathagat was not essential to overcome the miseries of life and hence an inessential metaphysical question to answer, and thus described best as indescribable.

Q1(b)

The above statement implies that use of inference to establish knowledge is better than establishing knowledge purely through perception (pratyakṣavāda). This has been argued by all Indian schools to counter the claim of Cārvāka; which only accepts perception as a valid source of knowledge.

Arguments against Bāhyapratyaksavāda:-

- (i) It is known that perception can often be misleading as in the case of illusions, dreams etc. Cārvāka argues against this stating that wrong knowledge is an error & hence not valid knowledge.
- (ii) Knowledge also implies knowledge of universals. However, perception can only provide ^{knowledge of} particulars.
- (iii) Often, one gains knowledge of unperceived things like consciousness / soul, through its manifestations. This cannot take place without perception.

(iv) lastly, it can be argued that Cāraṅka himself uses reason i.e. inference, to establish preception as the only true source of knowledge.

Thus, other Indian schools qualify inference i.e. Bahyanumeyavāda as ~~or~~ logically better than preception.

Q1d) All Indian philosophical schools barring Cāraṇvāka argue that materialism ~~cannot~~ explain all aspects of life. Essentially, all these sub schools discuss different paths to liberation which cannot be explained purely through materialism.

Cāraṇvāka believes that there is no eternal soul, but that consciousness is just a product of matter. Thus, for it material existence is the only true life as life ends on death.

This view is not supported by other schools. Buddhism aims at helping people attain Nirvāṇa, which can only happen on cessation of clingingness to material life. Moreover it ~~refutes~~ refutes permanence of matter on the basis of its theory of momentariness i.e. kṣaṇikvāda.

Jainism's kevalya can only be attained by dissociation of matter (karma pudgal) with the soul (Jīva).

Similarly, Sāṅkhya-Yōga explains that liberation can only be explained as disassociation of Prakṛti & Puruṣa. Though, this system accepts materialism in the form of Prakṛti, in itself it is dependent on Puruṣa for its manifestation.

Finally, Vedānta explains that true Brahman is pure consciousness with the quality of eternal bliss i.e. sacchidananda. What is perceived as matter is only Māyā also described as ignorance.

Thus, though these schools accept materialism to explain the phenomenal world, they all except Cārvāka argue it as an incomplete aspect.

Q 1c) Jainism is a realist-relativist-
~~plur~~ pluralist school. Syādvāda aims
to establish that ~~the~~ there exists an
infinitely complex reality (ananta-
dharma-kam - vastu). However, by
characterising it as purely a theory of
relativity it could be argued that it
does not explain objectivity. Though,
this would not be accepted by Jainas

Syādvāda implies that at the empirical
level one can only perceive a thing from
a particular aspect. One cannot know all
aspects of a thing at the same time.
Thus, one's judgement should be qualified
by Syāt, that can loosely be
translated as 'somehow'

This however, does not imply
~~into~~ idealism, because Jainas do not
reject the actuality of something.
Syāt does not imply that a thing can
only be known from a particular aspect,

but that there is innumerable aspects .
Moreover, a *kevalajñāni* i.e. the
omniscient has a knowledge of all
aspects of an object. Thus, he knows a
thing ~~as~~ as it is .

In conclusion, it can be argued
that Jainas accept relativity of views
at the empirical level of an bonded soul
but accept absolute realism for a
kevalajñāni this it is consistent with
Jualism .

Q20

Prakriti is one of the two absolute realities in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy. It is described as the root cause of all objects and as its uncaused cause. Thus, Prakriti is the cause of all particular objects in the universe. Moreover, the universe evolves because of the manifestations of Prakriti.

Thus, Prakriti is an universal whole. Objects are particulars formed out of Prakriti on its evolution.

Prakriti is the cause of ~~the~~ all worldly objects, however ~~its~~ its actual state is ~~when~~ during pralaya or dissolution. During this unmanifest state no objects exist.

All objects are condition and dependent and thus, cannot be self caused. This implies the existence of a unconditional, independent prakriti as the root cause.

Similarly, all objects have similar/common properties which display different proportion of attributes of sattva, rajas & tamas. Thus, there must exist a source of these common characters i.e. Prakriti.

In conclusion, it can be argued that ~~Prakriti~~ prakriti is the source of all worldly objects which in totality point to a root cause i.e. Prakriti.

Q 2(b)

In Sāṃkhya philosophy, Prakṛti or the root cause is composed of three inseparable, interdependent attributes or Guṇās i.e. Sattva, Rajas, Tamas. These are not accidental qualities but essential components like three strands of a rope. All characteristics of ~~prakṛti~~ world objects is ~~is~~ because of varying composition of the three guṇās.

Description of the three Guṇās

- (i) Sattva - Characterized by lightness and pleasure; it is responsible for manifestation of thoughts and imagination. By itself it is inactive, but is responsible for buoyancy & upward movement. It is primarily responsible for the Puruṣa identifying itself with Prakṛti as it reflects Puruṣa's consciousness off itself.
- (ii) Rajas - is the property of motion and restlessness. It causes pain and has the colour red associated with it. It is responsible for providing motion to

both sattva & tamas, which are in themselves inactive.

- (iii) Tamas is the property of indifference. It causes inactivity, sleep & laziness.

Role of the Gunās in evolution / Ranga
on association of Prakṛti with Puruṣa, it goes from a state of sāmyawasthā or a state of homogeneous changes in the three Gunās to the state of viccham-awasthā (or state of heterogeneous changes). These heterogeneous changes lead to formation of different worldly objects.

- (i) Sattva guna contributes to formation of mahat (buddhi), ahankāra, eleven organs i.e. ^{five} jñānendriya, five organs of action karmendriya & the manas.
- (ii) Tamas contributes to formation of 5 subtle elements i.e. tanmātras.
- (iii) Rajas supplies energy for the necessary changes of sattva & tamas.
- Thus, the three gunas are essential constituents of Sāṅkhyan conception of Prakṛti.

Q 2(c) Ahankāra is the ~~third~~ ^{second} evolute to be formed after Mahat in the evolution of Prakriti during sarga.

The function of Ahankāra is as the ego substance and thus to provide the feeling of 'I' or 'mine'. This is thus, an essential product when the puruṣa identifies itself with prakriti that can be described as bondage (though in reality the puruṣa is eternally free)

The Ahankāra is said to be of three kinds based on the predominance of one or the other of the three gunas.

(i) Mind / ~~manas~~ manas which is predominantly sāttvika & thus sāttvika ahankāra.

(ii) 10 organs - 5 sense organs (jñānendriya) & five motor organs (karmendriya) is formed from sattva & rajas thus are rājās ahankāra.

(iii) Five ~~subtle~~ subtle elements formed from tamas can tanmantras.

Thus, its ahankara is the ^{major} constituent
of the phenomenal world and the
main manifestation in evolution of
prakrit

Q. 2(d)

According to Sāṅkhya, Prakṛti can only be inferred from her products on her but cannot be known in her true state. It has also been characterized as a woman with the quality of *danṣhanā* & *sthām*. This is opposed to the masculine version of puruṣa or true consciousness. Thus, ~~it is~~ only during evolution on the association of Prakṛti & puruṣa can prakṛti evolve & be known to the ~~pure~~ puruṣa. ~~or~~ ~~or~~

During bondage the ~~pure~~ puruṣa identifies itself with prakṛti, but on liberation it identifies itself as separate from prakṛti. It is this that is characterized as knowing the 'true colours' of prakṛti.

Sāṅkhyan Puruṣa is eternal consciousness i.e. eternally free. ~~Bondage~~ Bondage of puruṣa happens when it mis-identifies itself with prakṛti. This ~~is~~ bondage is however only of the phenomenal ego. Such a ~~phenomenal~~ bondage

leads to manifestation / evolution of
Prakṛti. However, when the Puruṣa
recognized his mistakes & realizes
he eternally free existence it understands
that Prakṛti in itself is unintelligent,
lead to dissolution of world, thus,
the Puruṣa sees the true form of Prakṛti.

Such a liberated Puruṣa can never
again associate with Prakṛti, who
thus, never reappears to a liberated Puruṣa.

Q 319)

The above ~~argument~~ ^{statement} is Śaṅkaras argument against the pluralistic realism of Jainas' theory of Saptabhāṅginaya. Śaṅkarā argues that because Jainism accepts pluralism & ~~can~~ cannot reconcile it into one absolute reality it is like scattered pearls not woven into a ^{garland} ~~garment~~.

Consequence of Saptabhāṅginaya

This theory allows the relativity & plurality of knowledge. It implies that all objects have innumerable aspects which can be known at a time ~~from~~ from a particular aspect or condition.

Saptabhāṅginaya also leads to Jainas' arguing that a liberated soul or svalyajñāni can know all aspects of a thing and thus construct the object or know it as it truly exists.

Śamkara's arguments :-

- (a) Saptakhanginaya's (Seven-fold judgement) last three steps are just permutations of the first four and thus the same as chaturkolis of Buddhists & Vedantins.
- (b) True reality cannot be the arithmetic addition of all individual aspects. Instead, it must be an organic synthesis.
- (c) By failing to combine plurality of reality no true knowledge can be ~~att~~ achieve. This can only happen by ~~acc~~ accepting one absolute reality.
- (d) By accepting absolute knowledge of Koval's Jaina are half heartedly accepting absolutism.

Conclusion - Saptakhanginaya only allows for plurality of knowledge or manyness of reality. Without uniting them they only act as scattered ~~pearls~~ pearls & not as a philosophical garland.

Q 3(b)

Jiva of Jainism is the pure conscious soul that is the true knower (jñātā), agent (karta) & experiencer (bhokta) which in its free state ~~is~~ has the properties of infinite faith, power, knowledge & ~~the~~ bliss. This concept is ~~to~~ similar & different with Ātmā & Puruṣa.

Similarities with Ātmā & Puruṣa :-

- (i) All have the essential property of consciousness.
- (ii) All three are of subjects & not objects.
- (iii) All go through bondage & liberation.

Dis-similarities with Ātmā

- (i) Ātmā or pure consciousness is the only true reality with properties of pure bliss (sacchidananda). True Brahman is only consciousness & material world is experience due to ignorance or Māyā. While Jains, believe in existence of both Jiva & matter.
- (ii) There is only one Ātmā for Vedāntics while Jainas believe in manyness of souls (Jiva).

Dis-similarities with Puruṣa

- 1) The true Puruṣa is eternally free. It is only the phenomenal ego of Sāṃkhya that goes through bondage & liberation. However, it is the Jīva of Jainism which directly undergoes bondage & liberation.

However, it is essential to note that both Jainism & Sāṃkhyan accept plurality of souls.

In conclusion, though Jīva is essentially similar to Ātma & Puruṣa, there are some essential differences as well.

Q 3(d) Both Buddha & Hume believe in the non-reality of a permanent self; i.e. the no-soul ~~the~~ theory. However, while Buddha's soul-theory is based on causality, Hume reject causality & bases continuity of experience on the law of association.

Buddha's Niratmyavāda

Niratmyavāda is one of the corollaries of the theory of Pratityasamutpada or causal efficiency. Thus, each moment is dependent on its preceding moment for its existence. Thus, while there is no permanent soul, existence of consciousness is dependent on past action. Thus, Buddha explains that only if one understands this causal efficiency, one can achieve nirvāna. Thus, past karma determine future existence of self in this world of suffering.

Hume's Theory of Soul

Hume also rejects a permanent soul and explains that what one accepts as continuity of soul or consciousness as a series of momentary experiences.

However, Hume rejects causality as it cannot be ~~to~~ established through experience. Instead, he explains continuity through the law of association, where the mind relates one experience to another.

Conclusion

While Buddha's aim to explain Niratīvāda through ~~to~~ causality aimed at explaining a path to Nirvāna; Hume's momentariness aimed at establishing empiricism.

Q4(a)

Cārvāka is a materialistic school of Indian philosophy; its ethics believe in leading a life purely in the phenomenal world and results from its rejection of a permanent soul based on its epistemology.

Cārvāka Epistemology - Cārvāka only accepts perception (pratyakṣa pramāṇa) as a valid source of knowledge. Thus, it rejects the validity of inference & ~~and~~ testimony.

Cārvāka metaphysics

Based on perception, Cārvāka argues that consciousness is the product of matter & co-extensive with it. There is no existence of a separate soul as such cannot be directly experienced. Further, it rejects continuity of a soul after death. Thus, Cārvāka also rejects the theory of bondage, liberation & an eternal soul guided by theory of karma.

Cāravāka Ethics - Thus, Cāravākas argue that one must lead their lives only taking into account needs of the body in this life & not care about future existence of the ~~soul~~ soul. This is denounced by other Indian schools calling such a life hedonistic & only for pleasure.

However, historical accounts through limited talk about śramaṇa Cāravākas who believe in moral living based on community rules. Thus, the school cannot be called purely hedonistic though its materialism is often denounced.

Conclusion - Cāravākas ethics of materialism thus, results from its ~~theory~~ acceptance of perception & of consciousness co-extensive with body.

Q 4 (b)

Inference is considered as an important source of knowledge but Cāraṇvāka rejects it because of the following reasons:-

- (i) Inference jumps from the unknown to the known.
- (ii) Just because, the vyapti is usually seen does not imply that there is no exception for the vyapti.
- (iii) All connection in vyapti cannot be perceived.
- (iv) Fallacy of petitio principii as the knowledge is already contained in the inference, thus, there is no new knowledge.
- (v) Acceptance of inference based on testimony cannot be accepted because they are themselves doubtful.

However, the other Indian schools reject these arguments by Cāraṇvāka, arguing that Cāraṇvāka itself uses reason & thus, inference to reject

Q 5 (a) Buddhism believes in the theory of Niratmyavāda or the ~~no~~ no-soul theory. This basically denies the existence of a permanent soul. Thus, it rejects possibility of Rebirth. What is ~~is~~ characterized as rebirth is only the formation of a new momentary consciousness.

Niratmyavāda is a ~~the~~ corollary of ~~the~~ Pratityasamutpada or the theory of causal efficiency. According to this, birth occurs because of the following twelve steps: -

- 1 Ignorance. (Avidyā)
- 2 Karmic Impression (Samsāra)
- 3 Initial consciousness in embryo. (Vijñāna)
- 4 Psycho-physical being. (nāma-rūpa)
- 5 Six sense organs. (śaḍaiśvarya)
- 6 sense organ - object contact (sparśa)
- 7 Sense experience. (vedanā)
- 8 Desire (tṛṣṇā)
- 9 Clingingness. (upādāna)
- 10 Will to be born. (Bhāva)
- 11 ~~Jana-maran~~ Birth (Jāti)
- 12 Suffering. (Jana - Maran).

Thus, birth is dependent on the Bhava Chakra & it has no independent existence. Thus, only on the basis of past experience & will to be born can birth take place.

One who understands this causal chain realizes that there is no real existence of soul & what is considered as a soul is only momentary existence of experiences. In such a state one can break this causal chain & attain nirvana.

On attaining nirvana, Buddha has not explained the continued existence of soul, thus there is no real re-birth, as every soul is just a new experience.

Q5(b) The theory of momentariness (Kṣāṇakāṅgavāda) is a corollary of pratītyasamutpāda or the theory of causal efficiency, which implies that existence of something is dependent on its preceding link, which causes its subsequent link & so on. Thus, there is production of new link and destruction of preceding link, thus there is no permanent existence only causal efficiency. This theory of Kṣāṇikavāda was heavily criticized by Sāṅkara:-

- (a) If it is asserted that a fully developed link causes the subsequent ~~the~~ link, then they both exist simultaneously refuting momentariness.
- (b) If the causal link is destroyed before production of effect, then its effect cannot be produced as it must have elements of the cause.
- (c) If production & destruction are nature of a thing then they become synonymous which is not possible.

(d) If production & destruction both exist ~~there~~ then there exists three moments of production, destruction & existence refuting kṣānikvāda.

(e) If production & destruction are absolutely different, then they both become permanent.

(f) Kṣānikvāda leads to momentariness of soul which defies theory of karma & causes problems of memory.

Conclusion - While Śaṅkara has raised valid arguments against kṣānikvāda it is counter-argued that he has explained them as per the '4ms' based definition of kṣāna which was not the actual basis of causal efficiency based kṣānikvāda. It actually implied impermanence.

Q 5(c)

Nāgārjuna's 'śūnyavāda' describes the theory of causation, because of of conditionality & impermanence, thus, causal efficiency takes a view that is in between ~~etern~~ eternalism (permanence) & annihilation (~~and~~ no-existence).

Pratityasamutpada implies causal efficiency. This exist because they have been caused, Thus, there is continuous production & destruction. If the cause for a phenomena is remove it changes or disappears from existence. Thus, existence implies mutual dependent origination.

However, pratityasamutpada does not imply that 'No-thing' exists. For example, while Buddha denies existence of a permanent soul, he explains that what we experience as consciousness is a continuous stream of momentary consciousness linked together by causal efficiency.

This is ~~fund~~ basis of causal efficiency leads to the following corollaries -

- (i) Theory of Karma
- (ii) Niyativāda
- (iii) Sanghativāda
- (iv) Kāhānikāda
- (v) ~~Arth~~ Arthakriyavāda

All of the above imply mutual dependence. Thus, Buddhism does not totally reject existence neither does it accept permanence of reality.